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Note
Super-Sized with Fries:
Regulating Religious Land Use
in the Era of Megachurches
David B. Zucco*
A McDonald's may be opening in your neighborhood. The
fast-food giant is not coming to an area strip mall or to a new,
over-conceptualized gas station, surprisingly, but to a location
many residents might find unsettling-the local church.' They
are known as "megachurches,"' and in an America obsessed
with size and "one stop" convenience, the huge congregations3
that make up these institutions are the fastest growing in the
country.4 While there is no universal definition,5 megachurches
can be broadly characterized as religious institutions working
to establish "full-service" havens that oftentimes are available
"24/7."6 As such, megachurches present a significant problem
for city planners: How should a place where it is feasible to
"eat, shop, go to school, bank, work out, scale a rock-climbing
* J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999,
Carleton College. The author would like to thank Professor Ann Burkhart for
her enthusiasm, Kelly Pierce for her editorial assistance, and Justin for his
patience.
1. A McDonald's restaurant was slated to open last year at Brentwood
Baptist Church in Houston, Texas. Patricia Leigh Brown, Megachurches as
Minitowns, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2002, at F1.
2. Charles Trueheart, Welcome to the Next Church, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Aug. 1996, at 38 (stating that the appellation stems from the "hugeness" of the
institutions). Other labels are sometimes used, including "full-service
churches, seven-day-a-week churches, pastoral churches, apostolic churches,
'new tribe' churches, new paradigm churches, seeker-sensitive churches, [and]
shopping-mall churches." Id.
3. Megachurches are huge in both size and number of members. South-
east Christian Church in Louisville, Kentucky, for example, has 22,000 parish-
ioners and a 50,000-square-foot activities center. Brown, supra note 1.
4. Trueheart, supra note 2, at 38.
5. See Jim Schwab, Zoning and Big Box Religion, ZONING NEWS, Nov.
1996, at 1 (reporting that communities "tend to know one when they see one").
6. See Brown, supra note 1.
416
RELIGIOUS LAND USE
wall and pray... all without leaving the grounds"7 be regu-
lated? Put another way, to buy a home next to a church offering
a few weekend services is one thing; it is quite another matter
to invest in property only to have a neighboring church build a
Christian-themed water park complete with laser-light shows
depicting Jonah and the whale.8
September 22, 2000, marked the beginning of the latest
chapter in the ongoing conflict between municipalities and
churches over religious land use. On that day, President Clin-
ton signed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Per-
sons Act (RLUIPA) into law. 9 RLUIPA, intended to protect "one
of our country's greatest liberties,"0 provides that if a state or
local government in the process of regulating land "substan-
tially burdens the exercise of religion, it must demonstrate that
imposing that burden on the claimant serves a compelling in-
terest by the least restrictive means."1' It has been hailed by
many as a wake-up call to insensitive zoning officials who push
churches from their jurisdictions, while others have recoiled in
horror at the thought of churches being able to use RLUIPA to
charge "discrimination" any time they do not want to comply
with a reasonably neutral law."
Megachurches, in a sense, are at the heart of this matter,
which some believe to be one of the country's "next big issues."3
7. Id.
8. See id. (reporting that a Phoenix-area church is planning such a
place).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
10. President's Statement on Signing the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000, 36 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 2168, 2168
(Sept. 25, 2000).
11. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
12. See infra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
13. Marci Hamilton, General Land Use Laws and Religious Buildings:
The Controversy Heats Up, FindLaw's Writ (May 10, 2001), at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20010510.html); see also Alan C.
Weinstein, Land Use Regulation of Religious Institutions: Balancing Planning
Concerns with Constitutional and Statutory Safeguards for Religious Freedom,
in PROTECTING FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
LAND USE LAW 145, 146 (Daniel R. Mandelker & Rebecca L. Rubin eds., 2001)
(noting that disputes over zoning and "religious" uses of property seem to be
on the rise). The sharply divided decisions on similar matters at the state
court level also suggest the ripeness of the issue and indicate that guidance
from the Supreme Court is needed. See U.S. Supreme Court Denies Review of
California Case Upholding State Law Allowing Religious Organizations to Ex-
empt Their Property from Landmark Designation, LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
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Megachurches beg the following question: What does it mean to
"exercise" religion in contemporary society? While some might
attest that the change in the way Americans worship has re-
sulted in discriminatory zoning practices, others might posit
that this change-this abandonment of "centuries of European
tradition and Christian habit""'-has produced religious envi-
ronments unimaginable to the planning pioneers of the early
twentieth century and thus requires a reevaluation of how
churches should be situated in a community. While the long-
term viability of RLUIPA is still up for debate, 5 it is certain
that the Act impacts today's decisions concerning the regula-
tion of religious property, and as such, governments and reli-
gious leaders must work to understand the law's true meaning.
This Note explores the possibility of regulating mega-
churches in the context of RLUIPA. Part I provides a frame-
work for the problem by tracing the history of religious land
use in this country and the advent of megachurches. Part II de-
tails RLUIPA, its predecessor, the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act (RFRA), and the Supreme Court decisions to which the
Acts respond. Part III examines this legal landscape and then
suggests a system that categorically restricts megachurches to
nonresidential areas to balance the interests of the churches
and the general public. This Note concludes that such a strat-
egy stands up to RLUIPA's strict scrutiny standard.
I. REGULATING THE RELIGIOUS USE OF LAND:
THE CONFLICT IN CONTEXT
The implementation of land use planning has had a dra-
16
matic effect on the shape of American cities. While it is a rela-tively new concept, investigations into its beginnings reveal a
UPDATE (Nat'l Trust for Historic Preservation, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 2001,
at 7 (discussing E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. State, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal.
2000)).
14. Trueheart, supra note 2, at 37.
15. RLUIPA's constitutionality is hotly contested. Compare, e.g., Roman
P. Storzer & Anthony R. Picarello, Jr., The Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000: A Constitutional Response to Unconstitutional
Zoning Practices, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 929, 930 (2001) (claiming "[RLUIPA]
protects land uses from discrimination and undue burden, consistent with
constitutional limits on federal power"), with Ada-Marie Walsh, Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000: Unconstitutional and Un-
necessary, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 189, 190 (2001) (claiming RLUIPA is
an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause). A discussion of
RLUIPA's constitutionality is beyond the scope of this Note.
16. See infra notes 17-32 and accompanying text.
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rationale for its hierarchical system that might be surprising to
some. This historical background is necessary to understand
the place churches held-and hold-in cities across the country.
A. A NOVEL APPROACH TO A CITY'S ILLS
Zoning is "the division of land into districts having differ-
ent regulations."" The concept is a relatively new one. In 1916,
New York City adopted the nation's first zoning ordinance.'
The city's plan stemmed from nuisance law, the earliest form of
land use control."9 The doctrine of nuisance affords an individ-
ual remedies for any unreasonable interferences with the use
and enjoyment of his or her land.20 Historically, most nuisance
cases involved the establishment of a commercial or industrial
use within a residential area.2' Over time, judges came to real-
ize that, while not inherently injurious, some uses, like facto-
ries and refineries, were nuisances per se in certain neighbor-
hoods.2 In other words, even before the advent of zoning, courts
were comfortable concluding that because of their geography or
pattern of development, particular localities are "properly and
primarily devoted to certain activities and that the introduction
of incompatible activities must be deemed unreasonable."2 A
comprehensive set of regulatory ordinances like New York
City's, then, merely codified this notion by dividing the city into
three use districts: residential, commercial, and industrial. 4
Indeed, "[z]oning is recognizing through law and ordinance the
17. EDWARD M. BASSETT, ZONING 9 (Russell Sage Found. 1940) (1936).
18. Id. at 20-21. The city, driven by an understanding that, among other
things, "the conformation of Manhattan island tended to produce buildings of
great height and to cause congestion of housing and street traffic," id. at 23,
knew that simply regulating the height of buildings could only solve so many
problems. City officials were also concerned with the introduction of "improper
uses" into otherwise homogeneous areas, which generally resulted in the
"premature depreciation of settled localities." Id. at 25. The officials began,
then, to explore the possibility of a more comprehensive plan that would, un-
der state police power, regulate the use of buildings and land, in addition to
height. Id. at 23-27. The novelty of this plan was that it provided for different
regulations in different districts. Id. at 26.
19. See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.04 (4th ed. 1997).
20. DANIEL R. MANDELKER & JOHN M. PAYNE, PLANNING AND CONTROL
OF LAND DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 58 (5th ed. 2001) (citing
WILLIAM L. PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS
§§ 86-88 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984)).
21. MANDELKER, supra note 19, § 1.04.
22. MANDELKER & PAYNE, supra note 20, at 59-60.
23. Id. at 60.
24. See MANDELKER, supra note 19, § 1.04.
2003] 419
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fact that all parts of a city are not alike and that for the pur-
pose of health, morals or the general welfare of the community,
they should not be alike."25
The need for a comprehensive land use plan was soon felt
26by other large American cities, and eventually the United
States Department of Commerce stepped in to aid the process.2 7
In the 1920s, a committee was appointed to prepare a stan-
dardized zoning enabling act to serve as a model for future
state legislation.28 While some have modified its framework, the
Department's Standard Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) has been
used by every state in drafting zoning legislation.29 The SZEA
was crafted along the lines of New York City's zoning scheme,
in that it was rooted in the nuisance concept that established
residential districts must be shielded from offensive uses." The
Act empowered communities to divide themselves into zoning
districts to ensure that compatible and incompatible uses were
appropriately segregated.3' Section 3 of the SZEA elaborated its
purpose of promoting, among other things, the health, safety,
and general welfare of communities 32
25. CmC DEVELOPMENT DEPARTMENT, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, ZONING: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE 11
(1929) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
26. See BASSETT, supra note 17, at 45.
27. PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at 7.
28. Id.
29. MANDELKER, supra note 19, § 4.15.
30. See id.
31. Id. The constitutionality of zoning districts was confirmed by the Su-
preme Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The
Court's logic mirrored that of the New York planning pioneers ten years be-
fore. "Until recent years," the Court reasoned, "urban life was comparatively
simple; but, with the great increase and concentration of population, problems
have developed, and constantly are developing, which require, and will con-
tinue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of
private lands .... " Id. at 386-87.
32. MANDELKER, supra note 19, § 4.16. The SZEA's purpose statement
was recorded as follows:
Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive
plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety
from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general
welfare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowd-
ing of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate
the adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, and other public requirements. Such regulations shall be made
with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the character of
the district and its particular suitability for particular uses, and with
a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most
appropriate use of land throughout such municipality.
[Vol 88:416
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B. "CHURCH PURPOSES ARE PUBLIC PURPOSES" 33
Religious land use was not an issue in the early zoning de-
bates. In a statement explaining zoning principles and proce-
dures issued by the United States Chamber of Commerce in
1929, to give an example, there is no discussion of how
churches came to fit into a city's zoning scheme. 34 Nevertheless,
churches would remain unquestioned for years because the
word appeared in the exalted "Detached One-Family Dwell-
ings" division of the SZEA.35 Edward Bassett, considered the
founder of modern zoning,36 gave a reason for this occurrence in
his description of the deliberations surrounding the country's
first attempt at zoning:
When in 1916 the framers of the Greater New York building zone
resolution were discussing what buildings and uses should be ex-
cluded from residence districts, it did not occur to them that there
was the remotest possibility that churches, schools, and hospitals
could properly be excluded from any districts. They considered that
these concomitants of civilized residential life had a proper place in
the best and most open localities.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the nature of politi-
cal-ecclesiastical legislation in the United States was "'one of
religious freedom in favor of the churches and not against
them."'3' It followed that churches, long familiar with govern-
mental favors,39 would also find themselves in a special position
with regard to the new zoning regulations."°
Even before comprehensive zoning became common, many
municipalities adopted ordinances that protected churches.4 '
Id.
33. City of Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634, 639 (1852) ("It is presumed
that in the nineteenth century, in a Christian land, no argument is necessary
to show that church purposes are public purposes, and that inhabitants of a
town have an interest in ground reserved for such use.").
34. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at 11.
35. The "Detached One-Family Dwellings" delineation is described as "ex-
alted," because in a standard zoning scheme, "[tihe district of less restricted
use always admits the uses of the more restricted ones." BASSETT, supra note
17, at 63. "Detached One-Family Dwellings" are the least restricted use. See
PRINCIPLES, supra note 25, at 12; infra note 49 and accompanying text.
36. MANDELKER & PAYNE, supra note 20, at 197.
37. BASSETr, supra note 17, at 70 (emphasis added).
38. 3 ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES
369 (1950) (quoting LUIGI LUZzATTI, GOD IN FREEDOM 20 (1908)).
39. See id. at 418-28 (discussing, among other privileges, the exemption
from taxation of church property).
40. See id. at 369.
41. See JAMES E. CURRY, PUBLIC REGULATION OF THE RELIGIOUS USE OF
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
For example, certain types of establishments, such as theaters,
fire stations, and bars, were often excluded within a certain
distance from churches, or permitted only with church con-
sent.42 In a "Christian land," the argument went, "church pur-
poses are public purposes," and as such, every effort was to be
made to ensure the "maintenance, support, and propagation" of
• • 43
the religion. Minimizing the types of businesses that might be
"demoralizing or annoying" to churchgoers, then, was one such
44
way.
It was against this background that city planners crafted
the first zoning ordinances. Given the quasi-public status of
churches, excluding a church from any use district was nonsen-
sical because exclusion would bear no substantial relationship
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare of soci-
ety.45 Additionally, churches were perceived as being attachedto rsidetial" " 46
to residential districts. Bassett explained: "It was also recog-
nized that churches should be in quiet localities, and as they
are so intimately connected with home life they should be in
home communities." 7 He continued that:
[iut would be unreasonable to force them into business districts where
there is noise and where land values are high .... Some people claim
that [in residential districts] the numerous churchgoers crowd the
street, that their automobiles line the curbs, and that the music and
preaching disturb the neighbors. Communities that are too sensitive
to welcome churches should protect themselves by private restric-
tions.48
LAND 3 (1964).
42. STOKES, supra note 38, at 369.
43. Id. at 419 (quoting City of Hannibal v. Draper, 15 Mo. 634, 639
(1852)). Stokes pointed to this Missouri Supreme Court decision to illustrate
that courts frequently refer to the idea that churches confer a public benefit.
See id. It has been stated that churches receive exemptions (e.g., exemption
from taxation) because Congress believes any benefit conferred on the public is
a "relief to some extent of the burdens of the State in protecting the welfare of
its citizens." Id.
44. See id. at 369.
45. BASSETT, supra note 17, at 72. Zoning ordinances are only upheld if
they have a "substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, con-
venience, and general welfare of the community." Id. at 54; see also Storzer &
Picarello, Jr., supra note 15, at 930 (collecting cases holding that churches
promote general welfare); supra note 32 and accompanying text.
46. BASSETT, supra note 17, at 70.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 200. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin summarized this way of
positioning a church within a community:
The church in our society has long been identified with family and
residential life. Churches traditionally have been and should be lo-
[Vol 88:416
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It was not until 1949 that a court held land use regulation
could be "fully effective with respect to churches."49 Not surpris-
ingly, in the years that followed, the number of church zoning
cases increased dramatically.50 Today, the courts are divided on
whether churches may be zoned out of residential areas. Some
courts hold that religious institutions may be excluded if they
create problems, such as traffic or lower property values.5 Sev-
eral of these cases suggest classifying the institutions as "con-
ditional uses," stating that a city may prohibit a church in a
residential district only if problems are extreme. 2 Other courts,
however, treat churches as "preferred uses," holding that an
ordinance may not push a church from a residential district• 51
under any circumstance.
C. THE RAPID GROWTH OF MEGACHURCHES
The recent increase in the number of megachurches has re-
ceived much attention and will undoubtedly push courts to
come to a consensus on their status in residential districts. Na-
tional publications like the New York Times and the Atlantic
Monthly have detailed their practices, and religious scholars
and members of Congress have discussed their future. 4 The
megachurch phenomenon is directly linked to changes in mod-
ern American society and culture.5 As has been previously
noted, megachurches are difficult to define.56 Scott Thumma, a
cated in that part of the community where people live. They should be
easily and conveniently located to the home. Churches are not super
markets, manufacturing plants or commercial establishments and
should not be restricted to such areas. How can the exclusion of
churches from a residential area promote public morals or the general
welfare? To so hold is a failure to understand the purpose and the in-
fluence of churches.
State ex rel. Lake Drive Baptist Church v. Bayside Bd. of Trs., 108 N.W.2d
288, 301 (Wis. 1961) (Hallows, J., concurring).
49. CURRY, supra note 41, at 9 (citing Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. City of Porterville, 203 P.2d 823
(1949)).
50. Id. at 14.
51. MANDELKER, supra note 19, § 5.58 (collecting cases).
52. Id. (collecting cases).
53. Id. (collecting cases).
54. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; infra note 137 and ac-
companying text.
55. Scott Thumma, Exploring the Megachurch Phenomena, Hartford Insti-
tute for Religion Research, at http://hirr.hartsem.edu/bookshelf/
thumma article2.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2003).
56. See supra notes 2, 5 and accompanying text.
20031
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scholar at the Hartford Institute for Religion Research, de-
scribed megachurches at their most basic level as "congrega-
tion [s] which [have] two thousand or more worship attenders in
a week."57 But most commentators stress the all-encompassing,
"24/7" nature of the institutions as their defining characteristic,
rather than sheer size and number of congregants. 5" Whatever
the definition, the megachurch model makes sense to many. In
addition to being an effective way to communicate with indi-
viduals living in an increasingly secular society,59 it also re-
sponds to the unique spiritual needs of the early twenty-first
century.6" To others, however, megachurches present an un-
bearable stress on surrounding areas and thus, the newest
"not-in-my-back-yard" land use.6 '
Driven by marketing principles," megachurches seek to de-
termine the needs of potential parishioners and deliver appro-
priate messages to them in a way they can understand. To
this end, dynamic multimedia presentations in neutral settings
are often used to appeal to the average American's more secu-
lar-and thus familiar-experiences. 6 Leith Anderson, a lead-
ing megachurch pastor, notes in his book A Church for the 21st
Century that the New Testament of the Bible is "surprisingly
silent about matters that we [traditionally] associate with
church structure and life."6 The logic goes, then, that getting
an individual to join a church via a sports league, for example,
is no less churchlike than delivering a sermon to him or her
from a pulpit.
Megachurches are positioned to manage the needs of con-
temporary society. Megachurches have been described as
"Christian cocoon[s]" and "parallel universe[s] that [are] Chris-
tianized."66 Their practices reflect a desire by parishioners to be
submersed in "a universe where everything from the tempera-
ture to the theology is safely controlled."6 ' Dr. Randall Ballmer,
57. Thumma, supra note 55.
58. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 1.
59. See infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
61. See Schwab, supra note 5, at 1. "Not-in-my-back-yard" is also com-
monly referred to as NIMBY.
62. Trueheart, supra note 2, at 40.
63. See Brown, supra note 1; Trueheart, supra note 2, at 40-44.
64. See Trueheart, supra note 2, at 40-44.
65. Id. at 43.
66. Brown, supra note 1.
67. Id.
[Vol 88:416424
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a religion professor at Barnard College, posits that this all-
encompassing nature of megachurches protects congregants
from "a broader society that seems unsafe, unpredictable and
out of control, underscored by school shootings and terrorism."68
The McDonald's restaurant at Brentwood Baptist, for example,
is opening to "create a controlled, protective setting for...
kids."
6 9
From a theological perspective, this cocooning represents a
departure from the more traditional Christian mission of
neighborhood outreach.70 Megachurches concentrate most in-
tensely on personal growth, rather than on interpersonal rela-
tionships.7' While some might think this approach to be prob-
lematic on an abstract level, 2 others are more concerned about
the concrete effects megachurches have on surrounding com-
munities.73 The more use a church gets, logically, the more it
burdens its neighbors. With each new use comes "a slew of
negative secondary effects" like traffic and noise. Moreover,
the average megachurch parishioner is not drawn from his or
her institution's immediate vicinity, which means a guaranteed
influx of foreign vehicles.7'
II. REVOLT AND RETALIATION:
A HALF-CENTURY OF FREE EXERCISE JURISPRUDENCE
Land use conflicts between churches and municipal au-
thorities are most often rooted in the Free Exercise Clause of
the United States Constitution. Its guarantee is generally un-
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See David Schimke, The Mall Where You Talk to God, CITY PAGES,
Nov. 13, 2002, at 19.
71. See id.
72. See Brown, supra note 1.
73. See, e.g., Marci Hamilton, Struggling with Churches as Neighbors,
FindLaw's Writ (Jan. 17, 2002), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/
20020117.html.
74. Id.
75. See Schwab, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that most megachurch mem-
bers "drive to services from as far as 50 miles away").
76. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . U..." .S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis
added). Arguments based on other constitutional provisions are possible, of
course, but over time, the Free Exercise Clause has proven to be the most
popular. The other religion clause of the First Amendment, the Establishment
Clause, would seem to be particularly appropriate. In fact, many have tried,
albeit unsuccessfully, to invoke this clause in religious land use contexts. See,
20031 425
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derstood to mean that the government cannot improperly inter-
fere with religious activity.7 The evolution of modern free exer-
cise jurisprudence has been particularly volatile, and to apply
the current law as dictated by RLUIPA, it is indispensable to
appreciate the Clause's past.
A. THE BEGINNING OF THE MODERN PERIOD
Two cases serve as the foundation for modern interpreta-
tion of the Free Exercise Clause. In Sherbert v. Verner, 7 a Sev-
enth-Day Adventist was denied unemployment compensation
after having been fired from her job for refusing to work on
Saturday, her faith's Sabbath day.79 The Court engaged in a
two-part inquiry to evaluate the validity of the respondent's
claim that her right to the free exercise of religion had been vio-
lated. While the Court conceded that it was not possible for acts
prompted by religious beliefs to be completely free from "legis-
lative restrictions," it asserted that, to withstand a free exercise
challenge, a law must not actually infringe on this constitu-
tional right or alternatively, if a law does so infringe, it must be
justified by a compelling state interest.80 Moreover, it must be
demonstrated that there are "no alternative forms of regula-
tion" that could serve the compelling interest without compro-
mising First Amendment rights.81
e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536-37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring). A due process or equal protection argument might also seem apt, but
such a case can only be made if churches are being completely zoned out of a
jurisdiction. See generally Note, Churches and Zoning, 70 HARV. L. REv. 1428
(1957) (discussing possible arguments to support religious rights in zoning
disputes). Arguments based on state legislation are beyond the scope of this
Note.
77. See Weinstein, supra note 13, at 148-50.
78. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
79. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 399. The Employment Security Commission of
South Carolina found that her inability to work Saturdays was a disqualifica-
tion for benefits because she failed, without "good cause," to "accept 'suitable
work' when offered.. . by the employment office or the employer." Id. at 400-
01.
80. See id. at 402-03.
81. Id. at 407. This criterion became better known as the "least restrictive
means" analysis. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 578 (1993) (requiring that a state must "justify [a sub-
stantial burden on religious exercise] by 'showing that it is the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest' (quoting Thomas v. Re-
view Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (Blackmun,
J., concurring))). The first time such an analysis was applied to a religious
freedom concern was in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940). In
426 [Vol 88:416
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The burdensome nature of the South Carolina legislation
was obvious to the Court.82 If the respondent were not ex-
empted from the reach of the contested unemployment provi-
sions, she would be forced "to choose between following the pre-
cepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand,
and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to
accept work, on the other hand." 3 The lack of a compelling
state interest was also apparent. 4 "[O]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation," 5 according to the Court, and such threats were not
to be found in the record; the Employment Commission merely
suggested that without the challenged provision, claimants
might invent religious objections to fraudulently obtain bene-
fits.8" Finally, the state could not establish the impossibility of
less restrictive means to prevent fraudulent claims.87
Nine years later, the Court passionately reaffirmed the
Sherbert doctrine in Wisconsin v. Yoder.88 In Yoder, the Court
held that the Free Exercise Clause stops states from enforcing
compulsory school attendance laws.89 One of the respondents,
an Amish man, claimed religious beliefs exempted his daughter
from such laws.9° The Court set out to assess this claim by first
Cantwell, the Court held that, while a state has an interest in preventing
frauds on the public "under the cloak of religion," requiring a license to solicit
religious views is unconstitutional because more narrow means are available
to arrive at that end (e.g., the state could regulate the time and manner of so-
licitation generally). Id. at 306-07.
82. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
83. Id. at 404.
84. See id. at 406-09.
85. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
86. Id. at 407. This was compared to the logic of Braunfeld v. Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961), where a compelling state interest was found in offering a
standardized day of rest for all workers. In Braunfeld, the Court recognized
that, while it might make "the practice of [the Orthodox Jewish merchants']
religious beliefs more expensive," the benefits of a "Sunday closing law"
trumped this incidental burden on a group's religious exercise. Braunfeld, 366
U.S. at 605.
87. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
88. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
89. Id. at 234 (noting the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the
state from requiring children to attend high school until age sixteen).
90. One of the respondents, a member of the Old Order Amish religion,
pulled his fifteen-year-old daughter out of public school after the eighth grade
because he believed his child's attendance at high school was contrary to his
religion and way of life. Id. at 207-09. Specifically, he believed that such
schooling resulted in "an impermissible exposure ... to a 'worldly' influence in
conflict with [his] beliefs." Id. at 211. The school district, however, did not see
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reiterating the Sherbert test.9 Yoder's substantial burden dis-
cussion, however, addressed a question unasked by the Sher-
bert Court: What constitutes a religious belief?9" To have First
Amendment protection, the Court noted that a claim must be
grounded in a religious belief: "[A] way of life, however virtuous
and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reason-
able state regulation ... if it is based on purely secular consid-
erations."93 A remaining question was how to accurately deter-
mine what is religious and what is secular. The Court admitted
the question was a "delicate" one,94 but nevertheless, it haz-
arded a guess. After "unchallenged" expert testimony concern-
ing "almost 300 years of consistent practice," in addition to
"strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading... [the] re-
spondent['s] entire mode of life," the Court concluded that a
compulsory formal education requirement "would gravely en-
danger if not destroy the free exercise of [the] respondent['s] re-
ligious beliefs.""5
To this very substantial burden the State of Wisconsin was
expected to respond with a compelling interest. While the State
had Jeffersonian wisdom on its side,96 its arguments could not
pass constitutional muster. 97 The State claimed that, though
brief, the additional period of formal education the Amish
wanted to avoid was necessary to foster their effective and in-
telligent participation in the democratic process.98 The Court,
however, deemed the prospect of enlightened citizenship
"speculative,"99 and concluded that, given the commendable
the situation in that light; following a complaint by the school district admin-
istrator, the county court convicted the respondent of violating a Wisconsin
law that required children to attend school until they reach age sixteen. Id. at
207-08.
91. See id. at 214-16 (explaining that "it must appear either that the
State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or
that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest
claiming protection").
92. See id.
93. Id. at 215.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 219.
96. See id. at 221 ("[The State] notes, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out
early in our history, that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citi-
zens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if
we are to preserve freedom and independence.").
97. See id. at 222.
98. See id. at 221, 225.
99. Id. at 227.
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Amish system of informal vocational education, °° the State's
interest in compelling a few more years of school was "some-
what less substantial than requiring such attendance for chil-
dren generally."0 ' The compulsory school attendance law,
therefore, could not stand.
B. THE SMITH REVOLUTION
AND AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
The eventual questioning of Sherbert and Yoder's logic
stemmed from an unlikely source: peyote. In Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith,'0° the Supreme Court held that "the right of free
exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to com-
ply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the
ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his
religion prescribes (or proscribes),"' 03 thereby rejecting the tra-
ditional paradigm. The respondents in Smith were denied un-
employment benefits because they had been fired for using pe-
yote at a Native American church ceremony.' 4 Since the
ingestion of the drug had a sacramental purpose within their
religion, the plaintiffs argued the state's refusal of compensa-
tion violated their First Amendment rights.0 5
The Court's analysis suggested a fundamental difference
between religious beliefs and religious practices. While the
government may not be able to interfere with religious beliefs,
laws certainly can, in the Court's opinion, be crafted to regulate
religious practices.' If this were otherwise, "professed doc-
100. See id. at 223-25.
101. Id. at 228-29.
102. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
103. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring)).
104. Under an Oregon statute, the "knowing or intentional possession of a
'controlled substance" was prohibited unless a medical practitioner had pre-
scribed the substance. Id. at 874 (quoting ORE. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4)
(1987)). Peyote was considered to be within the definition of "controlled sub-
stance," and therefore according to the state, the plaintiffs engaged in illegal
activity that merited a denial of state benefits. Id. at 875-76.
105. See id. at 875.
106. Unpacking the true significance of "free exercise," the Court concluded
the free exercise of religion meant "the right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires." Id. at 877. But the Court did not limit its
meaning to the profession of beliefs. It noted that exercising religion often in-
volves more physical acts, such as "assembling with others for a worship ser-
vice" or "abstaining from ... certain modes of transportation." Id.
107. To be sure, government would be inhibiting the free exercise of relig-
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trines of religious belief [would be] superior to the law of the
land."'18 Moreover, religiously motivated physical acts do not
even merit evaluation for a "religious exemption" as defined by
Sherbert and Yoder.'09 Such a balancing test, the Court deter-
mined, is inherently flawed because it requires a determination
of what is "central" to an individual's faith-an inquiry beyond
the competence of the judiciary."0
Nothing could soften Smith's blow. No further action by the
Supreme Court could quell the fear of many that, because of
Smith, "[i]n time, every religion in America will suffer.""' In
1993, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA)"12 in direct response to the decision. 113 The authors of
the Act believed "government should not substantially burden
religious exercise without compelling justification," because
ion "if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in
for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display."
Id. (emphasis added). The Court did not believe, however, that from this logic
it followed that the plaintiffs would be immune from a law not explicitly tar-
geted at their religious tradition that was constitutional in all other respects.
Id. at 878. The Court scoured its past decisions and determined that it had
never held that "an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance
with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regu-
late." Id. at 878-79.
108. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67
(1878)).
109. See id. at 882-89.
110. Before applying a "compelling interest" test, it is necessary to deter-
mine what is "central" to an individual's religion. See id. at 886-87. And
"[wihat principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a be-
liever's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?" Id. at
887. On many different occasions, the Court noted, it had warned against the
dangers of "determin[ing] the place of a particular belief in a religion or the
plausibility of a religious claim." Id.
111. 139 CONG. REC. S14351 (1993) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (quoting
the Rev. Oliver S. Thomas). This statement takes into consideration the
Court's decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah. Id. There,
the Court held that, while in Smith it held that neutral laws of general appli-
cability that incidentally burden a religious practice need not be subjected to
strict scrutiny, it did not in any way mean to suggest that the purported neu-
trality of a law go unquestioned. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993). "[Ilf the object of a law is to infringe
upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not
neutral." Id. at 533 (emphasis added).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
113. Id. § 2000bb-(a)(4) ("The Congress finds that... (4) in [Smith] the Su-
preme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and (5)
the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a
workable test .... ").
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even "neutral" laws may "burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise."1 4 Therefore,
the purpose of the Act was to restore the compelling interest
test "as set forth in prior Federal court rulings.""' This meant
that, under RFRA, "[g]overnment [could] substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion only if it [demonstrated] that ap-
plication of the burden to the person-(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restric-
tive means of furthering that compelling governmental inter-
est.""
16
Soon after its enactment, however, a challenge was
brought to RFRA, or more accurately, to the authority of Con-
gress to enact such legislation."7 In City of Boerne v. Flores,"8
the Supreme Court held that Congress overstepped its ability
to enact legislation in reliance on its Fourteenth Amendment
enforcement power."9 The Court's analysis centered on the fact
that the power driving the Enforcement Clause is remedial, not
substantive."0 Using a proportionality analysis, the Court
114. Id. § 2000bb-(a)(2), (3); see also 139 CONG. REC. S14351 (1993) (state-
ment of Sen. Kennedy) ("'[Flew states would be so naive as to enact a law di-
rectly prohibiting.., a religious practice as such. Our free exercise cases have
all concerned generally applicable laws that had the effect of significantly bur-
dening a religious practice."' (quoting Emp. Division v. Smith, 494 U.S., 872,
893 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-(b)(5); see also infra notes 164-65 and accompany-
ing text.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b).
117. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
118. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
119. Id. at 532. Boerne involved a small church in Boerne, Texas, that
challenged the denial of a building permit based on a city historic preservation
ordinance restricting its ability to expand its facilities to meet the needs of its
growing congregation. Id. at 511-12. While the complaint included other
claims, the thrust of the litigation fell under RFRA. Id. at 512.
120. Id. at 519-20. Undeniably, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is
"'a positive grant of legislative power.'" Id. at 517 (quoting Katzenbach v. Mor-
gan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). But the Court was quick to point out that this
power is not limitless; a survey of the Amendment's history and relevant case
law indicated the nature of the remedial/substantive distinction. Id. at 518-20.
In other words, legislation is appropriately ratified if it prevents or ameliorates
a constitutional violation, but legislation cannot define the essence of such a
violation. See id. at 516-19 (explaining that altering the meaning of a consti-
tutional clause cannot be considered the same as enforcing the clause). If Con-
gress could do otherwise, it would render void the basic principles of constitu-
tional interpretation set forth in Marbury v. Madison. See id. at 529 ("If
Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's
meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, un-
changeable by ordinary means.'" (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,
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concluded that because RFRA applied to every conceivable level
of government and did not target any specific subject matter,
the Act was "completely out of proportion to a[ny] supposed re-
medial... object[ives]." 22 Under RFRA, the Court determined,
"[any law is subject to challenge at any time by any individual
who alleges a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of
religion."'23
C. REMIXED, REMADE, REMODELED
With RFRA invalidated, Congress immediately began to
redraft religious freedom legislation that would be able to with-
stand the Court's constitutional scrutiny. 124 After an unsuccess-
ful initial attempt,'25 Congress set in motion a bill that would
eventually be enacted as the Religious Land Use and Institu-
tionalized Persons Act of 2000.126 RLUIPA, as previously men-
tioned, provides that if a state or local government in the proc-
ess of regulating land "substantially burdens the exercise of
religion, it must demonstrate that imposing that burden on the
claimant serves a compelling interest by the least restrictive
means."'27 The effect of the Act, at first glance, is identical to
RFRA, but RLUIPA distinguishes itself from its failed prede-
cessor in its scope, 2' the authority by which it was enacted, and
its legal standards.
Understanding the logic underlying Boerne,2 ' the drafters
177 (1803))).
121. See id. at 530. "While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate re-
medial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and
the ends to be achieved." Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 532.
124. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
125. See Religious Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act of 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998).
126. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
127. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
128. As its name implies, RLUIPA is relevant only to free exercise viola-
tions in the areas of land use and prisons. Id. Moreover, within those two
spheres, RLUIPA responds only to "substantial burdens" that are found within
cases Congress has the power to regulate by the spending, commerce, or other
powers in Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Whereas in Boerne the
Court noted that RFRA "infiltrated" every level of government, 521 U.S. 507,
532 (1997), RLUIPA's narrow focus was intended to guarantee that it would
not meet an immediate demise like its predecessors. See 146 CONG. REC.
S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen. Kennedy).
129. See discussion supra notes 117-23.
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of RLUIPA carefully crafted the Act to fall within the Four-
teenth Amendment's enforcement power.30 The Court in Boerne
concluded that Congress could not act to enforce a constitu-
tional provision unless it had "reason to believe that many of
the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a sig-
nificant likelihood of being unconstitutional." 13' The legislative
history goes to great lengths to prove the Act "more than satis-
fies [this] standard."132 Unlike the paucity of evidence under-
lying RFRA, a "massive" amount of data was introduced during
RLUIPA's hearings to demonstrate a "widespread pattern of
discrimination against churches as compared to secular places
of assembly."1 3 Such a factual record, it is contended, is enough
support for a set of "prophylactic rules" like RLUIPA.
3 1
The evidence of discrimination in RLUIPA's hearing record
ranged from statistical surveys to that which was more anecdo-
tal in nature.' 35 Much of this evidence was taken from the tes-
timony and writing of Professor Douglas Laycock.' Professor
Laycock attempted to document the "widespread obstacles to
worship,"'37 and specifically, among other issues, to explain "not
only why large free-standing churches are not wanted in sub-
urban, residential neighborhoods, but also why they are not
wanted in commercial districts. 13  He opined that such
churches are more susceptible to NIMBY hostility139 than other
130. See 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy). RLUIPA also derives its power from the Commerce and Spend-
ing Clauses. Id. The legislative history of the Act justifies the use of these two
constitutional provisions summarily; the Spending Clause provisions of the
Act are taken directly from comparable civil rights law, while the Commerce
Clause provisions provide a "jurisdictional element," stating that the "burden
in question" affects interstate commerce. Id. (citing United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). For a discussion of the propriety of RLUIPA's use of
the Commerce Clause, see Evan M. Shapiro, Note, The Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act: An Analysis Under the Commerce Clause, 76
WASH. L. REV. 1255 (2001), which concludes that Congress exceeded its Com-
merce Clause power in enacting RLUIPA.
131. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Douglas Laycock, State RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 755, 756 (1999).
138. Id. at 758-59.
139. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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institutions of similar scale, because "any one church may have
only a few potential members in the immediate neighbor-
hood."4 ° Additionally, a good deal of neighborhood opposition to
development stems from bare animus.' Many Americans are
especially adverse to "high intensity faiths" and churches that
can be considered "conservative" or "evangelical."4 4 Laycock re-
ported that in 1993 "45% of Americans admitted to 'mostly un-
favorable' or 'very unfavorable' opinions of 'religious fundamen-
talists."4
RLUIPA's record also pointed to the legal difficulties
churches encounter when land use is at stake. 4 4 Professor Lay-
cock suggested the majority of problems follow from the fact
that zoning law generally vests wide-ranging discretion in local
zoning officials.' Even in locations with zoning codes that al-
low for them, the building and renovation of churches is often
conditioned upon the receipt of a special use permit. 46 Such
permits are only granted when all listed requirements are met,
yet the same zoning officials granting the permits are responsi-
ble for drafting their terms. 7 Confounding this problem, judi-
cial review of a local authority's grant or denial of a permit is
largely deferential and furthermore, litigation is often too
140. Laycock, supra note 137, at 759. "Only 40% of the population reports
regular church attendance." Id.; see also supra note 75 and accompanying text.
Professor Laycock notes that, given the potential number of customers who
would find such services convenient, the neighborhood response to the pro-
posed development of a new grocery store or movie theater would be markedly
different. See Laycock, supra note 137, at 759.
141. See Laycock, supra note 137, at 760.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting a Gallup poll).
144. See id. at 763-69.
145. Id. at 764-65.
146. Id. at 765; see also supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
147. See Laycock, supra note 137, at 765.
In a survey of Presbyterian congregations, 32% of the congregations
that had needed a land use permit reported that "no clear rules per-
mitted or forbade what we wanted to do, and everything was decided
based on the specifics of this particular case (e.g., variance, waiver,
special use permit, conditional use permit, amendment to the zoning
ordinance, etc.)." Another 15% reported that "even though a clear rule
seemed to permit or forbid what we wanted to do, the land use au-
thority's principal decision involved granting exceptions to the rule
based on the specifics of this particular case."
Id. at 767-68 (quoting Religious Liberty Protection Act of 1998: Hearing on
S2148 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (statement of
Professor Douglas Laycock, Univ. of Texas, 14-16 & Appendix, Question 9)).
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expensive for a church to undertake. 4
According to its proponents, RLUIPA also satisfies the le-
gal aspect of the constitutional standard set out in Boerne.149 It
is clear that RFRA was intended to usurp a portion of the
Court's power, 15 but each of RLUIPA's subsections was written
to codify the legal standards "in one or more Supreme Court
opinions."" RLUIPA, then, does not provide a new definition
for "substantial burden"; nothing in the Act is meant to give the
term "any broader interpretation than the Supreme Court's ar-
ticulation of the concept."52 But the Act does characterize the
nature of "religious exercise" that might be potentially bur-
dened:
(a) In general
The term "religious exercise" includes any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.
(b) Rule
The use, building, or conversion of real property for the purpose of re-
ligious exercise shall be considered to be religious exercise of the per-
son or entity that uses or intends to use the property for that pur-l5~3
pose.
The legislative history, however, clarifies that not every re-
ligious activity constitutes "religious exercise." 54 RLUIPA's
drafters understood that religious institutions often have ob-
jects similar to those of other, more secular, institutions. To
give an example, if a regulation burdens a commercial building
connected to a church through its financial support of church
activities, it is not considered to be a substantial burden on re-
ligious exercise.1
5
Responses to RLUIPA's passage were wildly divergent. Re-
ligious and civil rights groups, from the ACLU to the Catholic
148. Id. at 765.
149. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch
and Sen. Kennedy) (stating that the constitutional standard set forth in
Boerne "is not certainty, but 'reason to believe' and 'significant likelihood'").
RLUIPA "more than satisfies [this] standard-in two independent ways." Id.
150. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
151. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
152. 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy); see supra note 151 and accompanying text.
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (2000).
154. 146 CONG. REc. S7776 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
155. Id.
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Church,' 5r praised RLUIPA's power to compel "religiously in-
sensitive" zoning officials to make religious freedom a part of
the planning process. 157 In their view, "[w]hile churches are be-
ing eliminated from downtown and commercial areas because
municipalities believe that such uses do not attract enough
traffic to generate retail and tax revenues for surrounding ar-
eas, they are simultaneously being eradicated from residential
districts for creating too much traffic and noise."158 Others,
mainly those involved in local government, such as the Na-
tional League of Cities and the National Trust for Historic
Preservation, contended that RLUIPA is an attack on zoning
authority15 9 and that the Act invites religious groups to cite
"discrimination" whenever they want to avoid a reasonably
neutral law.6 °
III. REGULATIONS RESTRICTING MEGACHURCHES
TO NONRESIDENTIAL AREAS STAND UP TO RLUIPA'S
STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD
The emotional investment Americans have in their
churches makes the debate over religious land use regulation a
difficult one to adjudicate. Coupled with this more intangible
problem is the disjointed character of the last half-century of
Supreme Court free exercise jurisprudence and congressional
religious freedom legislation.' Whether a reviewing court
would uphold an ordinance restricting the land use of a reli-
156. The Act was "actively supported by a coalition of more than 60 groups,
including the ACLU, the Family Research Council, the Baptist Joint Commit-
tee, the Christian Legal Society, the American Jewish Congress, and groups
representing Christian denominations from Catholics to Mormons to Seventh
Day Adventists." Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, Final Pas-
sage of Breakthrough Religious Freedom Bill Hailed By Religious and Civil
Rights Groups (July 28, 2000), http://www.aclu.org/news/
NewsPrint.cfm?ID=8053&c= 142.
157. Storzer & Picarello, Jr., supra note 15, at 930.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND
INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT (RLUIPA) 1 (2001),
http://www.rluipa.com/generaldocs/NLC.pdf ("RLUIPA is a fundamental at-
tack on local zoning authority.... "); Stuart Meck, Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act, ZONING NEWS, Jan. 2001, at 3 (reporting that
the American Planning Association "opposes RLUIPA because it believes the
law effectively preempts local land-use authority" and that former New York
City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani has been sharply critical of the bill).
160. See Hamilton, supra note 73.
161. See discussion supra Part II.
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gious institution, however, presently depends on the applica-
tion of RLUIPA's strict scrutiny standard.162 There have not yet
been any opportunities to truly test this model. 6 3 To predict the
likely outcome of litigation under the Act, however, it makes
sense to root an analysis in pre-Smith free exercise jurispru-
dence. RLUIPA's legislative history, it will be remembered, ex-
plicitly states that the Act's standard is exactly the same as
that of RFRA164-and RFRA specifically declared as its objective
an overruling of Smith to reinstate the compelling interest test
set forth in Sherbert and Yoder. 6'
To explore the possibility of regulating megachurches
within this context, it is necessary to create a system of regula-
tion against which RLUIPA's standards can be applied. Cate-
gorically confining churches to a municipality's nonresidential
areas when they reach megachurch status makes sense as a
test model-it addresses the public concern over the effect the
institutions have on neighboring properties and, perhaps more
importantly, it eliminates the possibility of discriminatory deci-
sion making on the part of planning officials. An analysis re-
veals that such a system does not run afoul of RLUIPA because
it does not burden the exercise of religious beliefs. Alterna-
tively, even if found to substantially burden religious exercise,
the government could demonstrate that the system was en-
acted in response to a compelling interest and that its methods
are the least restrictive means to that end.
A. CATEGORICALLY RESTRICTING MEGACHURCHES
TO NONRESIDENTIAL ZONES IS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL
BURDEN ON RELIGIOUS EXERCISE
The party claiming a violation of RLUIPA bears the burden
of proof in showing a substantial burden on its free exercise of
religion. 66 If a party cannot meet its burden, its action fails
162. See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
164. 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy) ("Within [the] scope of [land use regulation and persons in state in-
stitutions], the bill applies the standard of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act.").
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-(b)(1) (2000) ("The purposes of this chapter are...
to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in [Sherbert] and [Yoder]
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened.").
166. 146 CONG. REC. S7775 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and Sen.
Kennedy).
2003]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
"without further consideration."167 RLUIPA makes it relatively
easy for parties to establish a burden on their religious exer-
168 btteesces
cise, but there is a limit to their success. That is to say, de-
termining a substantial burden depends on the definition of
"religious exercise," and not every activity carried out by a reli-
gious entity or individual constitutes "religious exercise." 169 It is
not possible for religion to be completely "free from legislative
restrictions, " "7 and the actions of religious individuals or
institutions, "however virtuous and admirable," do not merit
free exercise protection if they are secular in nature.' An
investigation into a violation of RLUIPA, then, must lead with
the following question: Does the regulation burden a religious
or secular activity?
The answer is as difficult as the question is "delicate.""' To
respond satisfactorily, a court must be able to determine the
makeup of religious beliefs and activities. According to Justice
Scalia, such philosophical investigations are beyond the compe-
tence of the judiciary.' But RLUIPA's drafters rejected his
wisdom and, consequently, decision makers are left to deal with
a few sentences from the Act's legislative history and a sketchy
guide left by the Court in Yoder.
Restricting megachurches to nonresidential areas poten-
tially burdens the free exercise of religion because such a regu-
latory system limits a megachurch's ability to locate, as a
right,' wherever it pleases within a community. The burden,
however, is not one of total exclusion.7 5 The system does not
mean to say that building a church within a given jurisdiction
is impossible. Rather, it is premised on the understanding that
churches are not immune from land use control under
167. Id.
168. RLUIPA's definition of "religious exercise" is quite broad. See supra
note 153 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
170. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (quoting Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961)).
171. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
172. Id.
173. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990). This logic was
the driving force behind Smith. It is not surprising that such wisdom was re-
jected; it flies in the face of the once generally accepted notion that religion
could do no wrong.
174. See discussion supra Part I.B.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(b)(3) (2000). Total exclusion would present nu-
merous constitutional issues and is expressly prohibited under RLUIPA. See
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RLUIPA176 and, because of the unique characteristics of
megachurches, the system does not "unreasonably limit[]
"177
their geographic destinies. In essence, a city's willingness to
adopt the system would stem from the repercussions it feels
due to these churches having thousands of parishioners and
operating "24/7. " 78 Therefore, to investigate the validity of such
a scheme under RLUIPA, it is necessary to determine whether
gathering in huge numbers is part of a system of religious be-
lief-and whether having, for example, an onsite coffee shop is
a necessary component of a church's religious practice.
In an attempt to deconstruct the practices of
megachurches, a case study is invaluable. Grace Church in
Eden Prairie, Minnesota, is an institution with 4500 mem-
bers 179 and is illustrative of megachurches across the country.
On Sundays, vehicles are directed by city police officers into
one of two "stadium-size" parking lots, while those who have al-
ready exited their vehicles are guided by "waving fluorescent
wands" towards the sanctuary, the crown jewel of Grace's $48
million, 62-acre campus.9 0 The sanctuary is surrounded by
glass-enclosed seating areas and the stage features two 18-by-
32-foot video screens to lead parishioners in hymns accompa-
nied by a full orchestra.'
The construction of an elaborate sanctuary, however, can
hardly be seen as a novel concept in the grand scheme of reli-
gious tradition. The unique features of Grace's practice lie
elsewhere. Grace's experience is not meant to end by noon on
Sundays. Not only are churchgoers given the opportunity to ex-
tend their worship through "commemorative videos, CDs, and
cassettes in the sweet-scented bookstore/gift shop just outside
",182[the] sanctuary, they are invited to spend more and more
time at the establishment by, for example, purchasing tickets
at the church's ticket booth for an upcoming national rock con-
cert in the auditorium or by utilizing some of the church's more
daily services: professional child care, chemical dependency
176. See 146 CONG. REC. S7776 (2000) (joint statement of Sen. Hatch and
Sen. Kennedy).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-(b)(3) (2000).
178. See Brown supra note 1.
179. See Schimke, supra note 70, at 19.
180. Id. at 17.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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programs, its health club, or teen center. 183
Grace's non-Sunday services "provide a place where fami-
lies can have all their needs met in a single location."184 They
are meant to give "practical support," to "help[ with the chil-
dren," and to "givef] people a place to socialize and recreate."' 85
The Grace program for singles is a good example of how these
services operate. Each Friday evening, young singles congre-
gate at the Divine Grind coffee shop, near the church's main
entrance, to socialize.'86 Those in attendance come to the gath-
ering because of a lack of other appropriate activities for "a
Christian single" to do and because, as one single remarked,
[ilt's a place where you know you're going to be loved no mat-
ter what you do."8 7
The "extra-religious" 88 activities of megachurches like
those of Grace Church seriously call into question whether the
bread and butter of megachurch practice-the reason for which
many municipalities want to regulate the massive institu-
tions 89 -falls within the meaning of "religious exercise" as un-
derstood by RLUIPA.' 90 RLUIPA's drafters were correct to point
out that sometimes religious institutions use real property for
"purposes that are comparable to those carried out by other in-
stitutions." 9' They also were smart to clarify that even if reve-
nue generated by these "other purposes" is used to further reli-
gious activity, that fact alone does not bring such ventures
within the Act's understanding of "religious exercise."'92 To say
otherwise would be to create a loophole every church could use;
churches are not-for-profit enterprises, so save corruption, any
profit they receive goes back to foster religious activities.
The megachurch model is, at its base, more like a business
than a religious one. Steeped in the teachings of marketing ex-
ecutives,8 3 megachurches are run like efficient corporations,
determining parishioners' needs and building churches accord-
183. See id. at 19.
184. Id. at 21.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 23.
187. Id.
188. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
190. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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ingly.'9 ' Grace Church, for example, knows what today's
churchgoers lack, and in addition to providing the word of God,
it is a place to help churchgoers with their daily tasks in a
shopping-mall-like environment; megachurches are employers,
entertainers, dating services, and personal trainers. 195 Religion,
some might say, is not all that is being exercised at a typical
megachurch.
The religious nature of some megachurch activity is also
called into question by Supreme Court precedent. In Yoder, the
Court set out to determine whether protecting children from
the influence of public education was a valid part of Amish reli-
gious practice. To do so, the Court relied on evidence of a
"consistent practice" and a "sustained faith pervading ... re-
spondent['s] entire mode of life." 97 Unlike the Amish practice of
shielding their children from "worldly influence," a megachurch
member's desire for "one-stop-shopping" is an entirely new
phenomenon.' Nothing like it can be found in the Christian
tradition.199 The idea is not rooted in anything religious; the
Amish practice, on the other hand, is based on a literal inter-
pretation of the Bible. °° Moreover, limiting the possible loca-
tions of a megachurch does not burden institutional leaders
with a "lose-lose" situation. In other words, whereas the re-
spondent in Yoder was forced to choose between honoring his
religious convictions and breaking the law, megachurch offi-
cials are not presented with such a predicament; officials can
exercise their faith and their civic duty by merely limiting their
worship to two out of three areas of a city.
20
'
The argument is often made that churches should not be
separated from the community, meaning, of course, from resi-
dential areas.0 2 To separate churches from their parishioners,
the logic goes, would be a substantial burden like no other.
"[Wiherever the souls of men are found, there the house of God
194. See Schimke, supra note 70, at 19-20.
195. See supra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
196. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
197. See id. at 219.
198. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
200. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216.
201. The Court concluded that such a choice rises to the level of a substan-
tial burden in Sherbert, too. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
202. See Storzer & Picarello, Jr., supra note 15, at 929.
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belongs." °3 But for megachurches, this line of reasoning is
weak. The typical megachurch does not identify with residen-
tial life. First, megachurches do not draw their worshippers
from their immediate vicinity. 0 4 Second, the raison dtre of
megachurches is to withdraw from community life. They have
206been described as cocoons and parallel Christian universes.
The practices of megachurches reflect an unapologetic desire by
parishioners to be submersed in a world where everything is
controlled.2 7 And from a theological standpoint, their departure
from the traditional Christian notion of community works and
outreach 20 1 means that location is not an important part of
megachurches' mission. Restricting megachurches to the
nonresidential areas of a municipality, then, is not a substan-
tial burden of their religious freedom under RLUIPA; their
practices would not be affected by such regulation.
B. GOVERNMENTS HAVE A COMPELLING INTEREST
IN CATEGORICALLY REGULATING MEGACHURCHES
TO NONRESIDENTIAL AREAS
Even if a reviewing court finds that keeping megachurches
out of residential areas constitutes a substantial burden on re-
ligious exercise, a government could prove that it has a compel-
ling interest to do so. A government justifies a typical zoning
ordinance by demonstrating that the regulation is rationally re-
lated to society's health, safety, or general welfare.29 RLUIPA
rejects this deferential standard with regards to religious land210 Se
use, and Sherbert and Yoder provide an indication of what
the Act's backers had in mind for its heightened level of re-
211
view.
Together, Sherbert and Yoder stand for the proposition
that only "non-speculative ", 21 2 interests of the "highest order"
213
203. Id. at 934 (quoting O'Brien v. City of Chicago, 105 N.E.2d 917, 920 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1952)).
204. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
207. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 164- 65 and accompanying text.
212. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 227 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963).
213. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
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can stand up to a legitimate free exercise claim. The Sherbert
Court was correct to dismiss South Carolina's argument that
the withholding of benefits from non-Sabbath workers was con-
stitutional, because the state was unable to show even the
smallest bit of evidence that unemployment funds would be di-
luted through false claims if the validity of the law were other-
214wise. The state interest in Yoder, too, was not deemed com-
pelling, but there the Court was presented with a more
complicated fact pattern. Wisconsin's interest in education,
unlike Sherbert's paltry claim of monetary loss, did seem to
border on those of the highest order,215 but still, the Court was
not convinced. Again, the fears of the State were unfounded:216
No evidence was introduced to establish the State's contention
that the Amish would fall into "a state of ignorance" without
compulsory education. 17
A government's interests in regulating megachurches are
distinctly different from those in Sherbert and Yoder. The im-
portance of property ownership rights in this country is not up
for debate. Further, protecting citizens from unreasonable in-
terference with their land is at the heart of government. 21 8 But
what most favors a municipality seeking to impose a religious
land use restriction are the undeniable stresses megachurches
place on a community. 9 Whereas in Sherbert and Yoder the
Court did not think there was enough evidence to establish a
definite detrimental effect on alleged governmental interests,
the potentially disastrous effects of a megachurch on a sur-
rounding residential area are understandable even by a layper-
son. The larger the church, the greater the stress on its sur-
roundings. With congregations exceeding 2000 and members
going to and from the institution seven days a week, it is far
from an unfounded fear to believe that megachurches will
bring, for example, traffic, noise, and safety concerns that will
overwhelm the single-family homes for which a residential area
was designed.
At the base of the megachurch land use problem is the re-
214. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
215. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221. The importance of education as an interest is
apparent, given the lengthy treatment of the State's argument compared to
Sherbert. See id. at 221-29.
216. See id. at 227.
217. See id.
218. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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ality that times have changed. When imaginative city planners
began to dream up the idea of zoning, a church was not in any
220way seen as a nuisance to a community. In fact, churches
221
were viewed as the opposite of nuisances. Church life was
confined primarily to Sundays, and the temporary influx in
traffic experienced by surrounding neighborhoods was tolerated
because churches, composed primarily of those living nearby,
were seen as working to foster the general welfare of the com-
munity.222 The new breed of megachurch, however, is not so
connected to its surroundings.23
A look back to the purposes behind the SZEA is revealing.
Cities were encouraged to divide themselves into use districts
because it was the most efficient way to ensure, in addition to
the broad goals of health and general welfare, the appropriate
distribution of public requirements such as water and transpor-
tation, the preservation of neighborhood character, and that
overcrowding would be kept in check. 24 Indeed, to think an-
other solution appropriate is to deny the absolute truth that all
parts of a city are different.225 But many still believe that
churches-even when they reach "mega" proportions-should
be able to locate, without debate, in any area of a city.226
Churches, somehow, transcend the realities of a growing popu-
lation and cultural trends, always maintaining a consistent
character. This point of view defies the logic behind zoning. As
the Supreme Court noted in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty,
the nature of land use in this country is in a constant state of
change, and when problems arise, new restrictions will forever
be required to deal with their repercussions. To be sure, the
latest chapter in Christian America presents such an issue, and
local governments thus have a compelling interest to deal with
it.
220. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 66-71 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., Storzer & Picarello, Jr., supra note 15, at 930.
227. See 272 U.S. 365, 386-87.
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C. CATEGORICAL REGULATION OF MEGACHURCHES
IS THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS TO THE GOVERNMENT'S
COMPELLING END
Categorical regulation is the least restrictive way for a lo-
cal government to manage the potential public concerns over
megachurches. The additional "least restrictive means" re-
quirement to the compelling interest standard is undoubtedly
important. Limiting religious freedom, no matter what the
cause, should never be done in a haphazard fashion. The yard-
stick set out in Sherbert, then, is reasonable and clear: There
must not be any "alternative forms of regulation" that could ac-
complish the same governmental goals with less impact on
First Amendment rights.228 Instead of denying any and all op-
portunity to provide benefits to those who have religious objec-
tions to work on the Sabbath, to use the facts of Sherbert as an
example, it would be more in line with the Constitution to es-
tablish a program of simple background checks to address the
potential for fraud by religious impostors. To proceed along the
lines of the former would be a grossly over-inclusive way to at-
tack the problem. That is to say, to reject all compensation
claims would preempt a few con artists, but such a system
would also eliminate the possibility of benefits for a potentially
huge number of religious individuals with legitimate Sabbath
scruples.
Unlike the uncompromising statute in Sherbert, categori-
cally restricting megachurches to development beyond residen-
tial areas is by no means over-inclusive. Megachurches, by
their very definition, are big.230 And by the very nature of their
practices, the use of megachurches is guaranteed to be in-
tense.231 Grace Church,232 with its stadium-size parking lots and
its myriad non-Sunday programs, is, if the base public concern
over megachurches is rooted in increased traffic and noise,
problematic per se. The church, which might be described as
relatively small,233 is guaranteed to have at least a thousand
cars (with even more noise-producing passengers) at any given
time. And nuisances of this nature can only be measured quan-
228. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 3, 57 and accompanying text.
231. See discussion supra Part I.C.
232. See supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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titatively, not qualitatively. When churches reach "mega" pro-
portions, therefore, it follows that they automatically become
problematic in residential areas. It is not possible to believe
that a few churches would be unfairly ousted from a residential
area under a system of categorical regulation because their cars
do not pose traffic problems.
In response to this line of reasoning, however, it might be
argued that, while over-inclusiveness is not an issue, categori-
cally regulating megachurches has the potential to be danger-
ously under-inclusive. Since there is no agreed-upon cut-off for
megachurch status,234 is it logical to assert that a church of
2000 members is possibly annoying to its neighbors whereas
one of 1000 is not? This point is conceded. But when it comes to
addressing religious land use, "legal difficulties" 235 necessitate
such line drawing. In fact, looking at the predicament more
closely, the system proposed is the only way to balance the
greater public concern of general welfare and the free exercise
issues of paramount importance to religious institutions.
Ironically, it is the religious groups seeking to build or ex-
pand churches that would benefit the most from categorical
regulation. RLUIPA, enacted with the explicit purpose to pro-
tect such development,236 brought to light the problems reli-
gious institutions often face when their proposals hit the desks
of local zoning authorities. 237 Through statistics and anecdotal
evidence, it was clear not only that bare animus was often at
work, 239 but also that the unfettered discretion the law affords
local officials can-and does-frequently result in discrimina-
tory decision making.20 The beauty of the system proposed by
this Note, then, is in its objectivity. While it is unfortunately
impossible for a law to alter personal prejudices, it is feasible to
draft statutes that take decisions with grave First Amendment
repercussions out of the hands of uninformed or insensitive in-
dividuals. Local zoning boards have in their tool bags a means
to accomplish just about any ends.24' Whether with a variance
or a special use permit, a zoning official can find a way to grant
234. See supra notes 5, 57 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 141-48 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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or deny whatever he or she pleases.242 Categorical regulation,
by guaranteeing that two out of three areas of a city are re-
served-as a right-for church development, is the only way to
keep this danger in check and to satisfy the divergent opinions
on the matter;24' any other system poses free exercise problems
far beyond those that might stem from disallowing residential
development.
CONCLUSION
The advent of megachurches in American society has cre-
ated problems for land use regulation unknown to the planning
pioneers of the early twentieth century. RLUIPA, enacted to
ensure the free exercise of religion, adds another dimension to
this problem by mandating a heightened standard of review for
all land use regulations that potentially burden religious free-
dom. Implementing a system of categorical regulation that re-
stricts megachurches to develop in nonresidential areas of a
city does not create a substantial burden on these institutions'
exercise of religion, because the system burdens secular prac-
tices, not religious beliefs. Even if such a system were deemed
burdensome, governments could demonstrate a compelling in-
terest in adopting it given the fundamental change in the way
these churches operate as opposed to those of the past. More-
over, governments could prove the system is the least restric-
tive means to further governmental interests, because it is not
over-inclusive and is the only way to eliminate the discretion-
ary decision making that oftentimes results in religious dis-
crimination. This system of categorical regulation is thus the
best way to balance the greater public concern of general wel-
fare and the free exercise issues of paramount importance to
religious institutions.
242. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text.
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